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Abstract
In [33], Kleijn presented a survey of the use of team automata for the speciﬁcation and analysis of
phenomena from the ﬁeld of computer supported cooperative work, in particular notions related
to groupware systems. In this paper we present a survey of the use of team automata for the
speciﬁcation and analysis of some issues from the ﬁeld of security. In particular, we show how
team automata can adequately be used to model and verify various access control policies, multi-
cast/broadcast communication protocols, and general (cryptographic) communication protocols.
Keywords: team automata, access control, security, cryptographic communication protocols
1 Introduction
Team Automata (TA) have originally been introduced in the context of Com-
puter Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) [5,18], but they have since proved
their use also in the context of security [3,4,6,7]. In [33] a survey of their use
for CSCW was presented. In this paper we survey the use of TA for security.
TA are inspired by—and form an extension of—Input/Output automata
(IOA) [40]. Like IOA, TA form a ﬂexible framework for modelling communi-
cation between components of distributed and reactive systems. They model
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the logical architecture of a system by describing it solely in terms of an au-
tomaton, the role of actions, and synchronizations between these actions. A
TA is composed of component automata (CA), which are ordinary automata
without ﬁnal states and with a distinction of their actions into input, output
and internal actions. The only diﬀerence between a CA and an IOA is that
IOA are by deﬁnition input enabled : in each state it must be possible to exe-
cute every input action. The crux of composing a TA is to deﬁne the way in
which its constituting CA communicate by synchronizations. Whereas IOA
are constructed according to a single and very strict method of composing
automata, in eﬀect resulting in composite automata that are uniquely deﬁned
by their constituents, there is no such thing as the unique TA composed over
a given set of CA. Rather, a whole range of TA, distinguishable only by their
synchronizations, can be composed over this set of CA. In particular, contrary
to the case of IOA, in TA also output actions may be synchronized upon.
The rigorous setup of these frameworks allows one to formulate and verify
general and speciﬁc logical properties of complex (distributed, reactive) sys-
tems in a mathematically precise way. In realistically large computer systems,
security is a big issue, and these frameworks allow formal proofs of correctness
of its design. Moreover, such a formal approach forces one to unambiguously
describe one’s design and it may suggest new approaches not seen otherwise.
The particular characteristics of TA with respect to IOA were showed to be
useful in speciﬁc circumstances, two of which we describe next. In [4], ter Beek
et al. use the synchronization of output actions to deﬁne so-called peer-to-peer
and master-slave synchronizations. These are two important CSCW phenom-
ena, which were thus introduced with a clear practical motivation in mind.
Neither of them can however be distinguished in IOA. In [6], ter Beek et al.
use the freedom of choosing the synchronizations of a TA over a set of CA
to deﬁne a so-called multicast composition operator ‖J as a one-to-J synchro-
nization between a sender and a subset J of the total set of receivers. This
notion cannot be distinguished in IOA.
This paper is a tutorial overview of research conducted in the last four
years on the use of TA for the speciﬁcation and analysis of security issues.
In particular, it covers the speciﬁcation of several access control strategies by
ter Beek et al. [4]—consequently veriﬁed by ter Beek and Bloem in [3]—as
well as ongoing work by the authors of the present paper on developing a TA
framework for the analysis of security properties—initiated in [6] and further
developed in [7]. We now describe each of these approaches in more detail. 1
1 Very recently, a ﬁrst attempt to use TA for the analysis of privacy properties was con-
ducted by Egidi and Petrocchi [16]. While their work is too recent for a full discussion in
this paper, we note that the authors use TA to model and verify a protocol for securing
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In [4], ter Beek et al. demonstrate the potential of TA for capturing infor-
mation security and protection structures, and critical coordinations between
these structures. On the basis of a spatial access metaphor, various known
access control strategies are formally speciﬁed in terms of synchronizations
in TA. In [3], ter Beek and Bloem moreover initiated an attempt to validate
some of the resulting speciﬁcations with the model checker Spin [32].
In [6], subsequently, the authors of the present paper showed the potential
of TA for modelling secure multicast and broadcast communication. To this
aim, TA are used to model an instance of a particular stream signature pro-
tocol. The one-to-many and one-to-all communications that are so typical of
multicast and broadcast communications, are captured by TA in a native way
as synchronizations between the set of CA constituting a TA.
In [7], ﬁnally, the author of the present paper develop a framework for se-
curity analysis with TA. First they deﬁne an insecure communication scenario
for TA, based on the addition of a so-called most general intruder to a TA
model of a secure communication protocol. The intruder is modelled as an
active agent able to inﬂuence the communication among honest agents. This
insecure scenario is general enough to encompass various communication pro-
tocols. Secondly, the Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC)
schema of [26] is reformulated in terms of TA and, subsequently, a composi-
tional analysis strategy is described for it, which can be used for verifying
security properties in the communication protocol modelled by the scenario.
Thirdly, this framework is applied to show that integrity is guaranteed for a
case study in which TA model a particular instance of the Eﬃcient Multi-
chained Stream Signature (EMSS) protocol family of [46]. This case study
shows the eﬀectiveness of this TA approach for a realistic stream signature
protocol, thus facilitating an easy comparison for those familiar with other
approaches.
The approach to use an automata-based formalism for the speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of properties in the ﬁeld of security is not unique, but has become
very popular in recent years [11,12,29,35,38,44,45,47]. We brieﬂy describe
some approaches closest to those surveyed in this paper.
Ongoing work by Chen et al. on the formal veriﬁcation of security prop-
erties of software is discussed in [11]. Their speciﬁc approach is to model the
particular software to be veriﬁed as a pushdown automaton and the security
property as a ﬁnite automaton, while model-checking techniques are used to
actually perform the veriﬁcation. An application of their approach can be
found in [12], where the access control policies of three diﬀerent Unix systems
are described and analysed.
agents in a hostile environment, focusing on privacy properties of the agents.
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In [47], Schneider deﬁnes so-called Security Automata as a form of Bu¨chi
automata, similar to ordinary (ﬁnite) automata, and applies them to a simple
access control model. Similar to composition of IOA and TA, so-called con-
junction security automata are deﬁned. It remains to be seen whether also
complex access control policies with delegation and revocation can be mod-
elled by security automata or in the approach of Chen et al.. We anticipate
that in [4], ter Beek et al. use TA exactly for such policies.
An experiment involving the combination of simple shared-key communi-
cation with the Diﬃe-Hellman key distribution protocol [14] is modelled and
proved correct using IOA by Lynch in [38]. As noted by the author herself, a
limitation of her approach is the fact that the protocol allows only purely pas-
sive eavesdroppers to listen in on the communication. This choice simpliﬁes
the formulation of compositional results, as an eavesdropper cannot change
the course of communication, e.g. by conducting a communication in which it
pretends to be an honest participant. Her approach does provide attractive
compositional reasoning techniques. We anticipate that we model an active
intruder in a TA setting in [7].
Finally, another related approach can be found in [44,45], where Oheimb
et al. introduce Interactive State Machines (ISMs)—yet another extension of
IOA—and apply them to security analysis. In fact, ISMs are used to model
and analyze the classic Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
in the version ﬁxed by Lowe [37]. A strong point of this approach is the fact
that it allows automatic veriﬁcation by deﬁning ISMs, and proving theorems,
in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [42]. What is missing are solid techniques
for compositional reasoning over more complex communication protocols. We
anticipate that in [7] we deﬁne a compositional analysis strategy for TA.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we informally de-
scribe how to use TA, after which the above-mentioned papers are surveyed
in Sections 3-5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Team Automata
In this section we informally describe the main characteristics of TA and how
to use them, rather than deﬁning the framework in all its technical details.
For more information on TA the reader is referred to [2,33,50].
To model a system as a TA, ﬁrst the components have to be identiﬁed.
Each of them should be given a description in the form of an automaton—
an easy to understand state-transition model that moreover forms the basis
for system descriptions in a number of model-checking tools [32,34]. Based
on the idea of synchronizations of common actions, these components can be
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connected in order to collaborate. Within each component, a distinction has
to be made between internal actions—which are not available for synchro-
nization with other components—and external actions—which can be used to
synchronize components and may be subject to synchronization restrictions.
By assigning such diﬀerent roles to actions it is possible to describe many
types of collaboration.
Consequently, for each external action separately, a decision is made as to
how and when the components should synchronize on this action. If the action
is supposed to be a passive action that may not be under the component’s
local control, then it can be designated as an input action of that component,
otherwise as an output action. If such a distinction between the roles of
an external action is not necessary, then the choice is arbitrary. A natural
option would be to make it an output action in all components in which it
occurs. Once the synchronization constraints for each external action have
been determined, one may apply, e.g., a maximality principle to construct a
unique TA satisfying all constraints. The composition used in IAO, e.g., is
mirrored by the so-called max-ai TA over a set of CA. In such a max-ai TA
the synchronizations between CA that are included are, for all actions, all and
only those transitions in which all CA participate that have the action in their
alphabet.
The TA framework thus supports component-based system design by mak-
ing explicit the role of actions and the choice of transitions that govern the
collaboration between components. The crucial features are the freedom of
choice for the synchronizations collected in the transition relation of a TA and
the possibility of synchronizing on output actions. In fact, in order for a TA to
be capable of modelling various types of collaboration between its components
by synchronizations of common actions, synchronizations between output ac-
tions of its components should not be excluded a priori, nor should the set
of synchronizations be ﬁxed a priori. Since these two features allowed the
deﬁnition of the above-mentioned peer-to-peer and master-slave synchroniza-
tions, they were given by [18] as the main reasons for introducing TA to model
groupware systems rather than using IOA for that purpose. The last feature
distinguishing TA from IOA, ﬁnally, is the fact that TA need not be input
enabled. Also this feature is motivated from practice. No matter how conve-
nient input enabling may be when modelling reactive systems, it does hinder a
realistic modelling of collaborations that involve humans—in fact, Tuttle him-
self was the ﬁrst to acknowledge this when he introduced IOA in [49]—while
modelling such collaborations was one of the main reasons for the introduction
of TA in [18].
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3 Access Control Policies
A vital component of the security of any (computer) system or environment
is information access control, but this is sometimes done in a rather ad hoc
or inadequate fashion with no underlying rigorous, formal model. In typical
electronic ﬁle systems, access rights such as read access and write access are
allocated to users on some basis such as ownership or ad hoc lists of accessors.
Within groupware systems, typically more reﬁned access rights are needed,
such as the right to scroll a document that is being synchronously edited by
a group in real time. Furthermore, the granularity of access must be more
ﬁne grained and ﬂexible in many cases, such as within a software development
team. Finally, it is important to control meta access rights. For example, it
may be useful for an author to grant another team member the right to grant
ﬁle access to non-team members (i.e. delegation).
In [4], ter Beek et al. use a spatial access metaphor based upon work of
Bullock et al. [9,10]—where access control is governed by rooms, or spaces,
in which subjects and objects reside, and the ability of a subject to traverse
space in order to get close to an object. A virtual reality is considered in which
a user can traverse from room to room by using keyboard keys, the mouse,
or fancier devices. It is a natural and simple extension to assume that access
control checking happens at the boundaries (doors) between spaces (rooms)
when a user attempts to move from one room to another. If the access is
OK, then the user can enter and use the resources associated with the newly
entered room. By adopting a spatial approach to access control, one exploits a
natural part of the environment, making it possible to hide explicit technical
security mechanisms from end users through the natural spatial makeup of
the environment. These users can then make use of their knowledge of the
environment to understand the implicit security policies. Users can thus avoid
understanding technical concepts such as access control matrices, which helps
to avoid misunderstandings.
In the security literature, authentication deals with veriﬁcation that the
user is truly the person represented, whereas authorization deals with valida-
tion that the user has access to the given resource. In [4], only authorization
is considered. The goal is to connect the metaphor of spatial access control to
the TA framework, and to show how this combination facilitates the identiﬁca-
tion and unambiguous description of some key issues of access control. To this
aim, it is showed how certain spatial access control mechanisms can be made
precise and given a formal description using TA. To begin with, information
access modelling by granting and revoking access rights is introduced, and it
is showed how immediate versus delayed revocation (does a user immediately
lose its access rights when they are revoked—even if it is currently actively
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using the ﬁle—or can a user continue its current activity when its rights have
been revoked until it wants to restart this activity—at which moment an au-
thorization check is done to decide whether or not it has the right to restart
this activity?) can be formulated.
Subsequently, the study is extended to the more complex issue of meta
access control. This means that privileges such as granting and revoking of
access rights can themselves be granted and revoked. The notion of meta
obviously extends to arbitrary layers. An example of such a multi-layered
structure of meta can be seen in the journal refereeing process. The creator
of an article may delegate publication responsibilities to co-authors, who may
select a journal and grant read access rights to the editor-in-chief, who may
grant read access rights to assistant editors, who can then grant and revoke
read access to reviewers. However, should revocation of a meta right also
revoke the rights that were passed on to others? Here one touches upon the
issue of shallow versus deep revocation. Shallow revocation means that a
revoke action does not revoke any of the rights that were previously passed
on to others, whereas deep revocation means that a revoke action does revoke
all rights previously passed on. Shallow revocation is often the easiest to
model, whereas deep revocation is known as a big challenge to model and
implement due to the complicated (recursive) situations that may arise [13].
In [4] it is nevertheless demonstrated how TA can be used to unambiguously
and concisely model shallow, deep, and even hybrid revocation.
In [3], ter Beek and Bloem undertake an initial attempt to use the model
checker Spin [32] for validating some of the TA speciﬁcations of [4]. Model
checking is an automatic technique to verify whether a system design satisﬁes
its speciﬁcations by inspecting its behavior exhaustively, i.e. all possible input
combinations and states are taken into account. The design is to be given
in terms of (ﬁnite) automata and the properties that should hold are to be
given in terms of logical formulae. The model checking algorithm then checks
whether the particular model satisﬁes the particular property. Spin is one
of the best known and most successful model checkers, which was developed
at Bell Labs during the last two decades [32]. In [3], the TA speciﬁcations
of [4] are translated into Promela, which is the input language of Spin. Con-
sequently, the authors verify whether those TA speciﬁcations indeed model
deep revocation. It turns out that an additional notion of fairness is needed,
designating certain states as “illegal” in the sense that a TA is not allowed to
remain in those states for more than a limited period of time. Further research
in this direction is currently being undertaken.
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4 Multicast/Broadcast Communication Protocols
Multicast/broadcast communication technology was born with the intent of
saving bandwidth and CPU time with respect to the standard point-to-point
connection known as unicast. A single virtual connection indeed uses no more
bandwidth and resources for thousands of users than it does for a single user.
Multicast and broadcast communication however present substantial diﬀer-
ences. A sender transmitting a stream of data to a set of receivers could
broadcast the stream to all the connected recipients (e.g. TV broadcasts) or
multicast the stream only to designated recipients (e.g. pay-per-view TV).
Multicast and broadcast data packets are usually sent over unreliable trans-
port protocols, such as the User Data Protocol (UDP). This may cause packet
loss, i.e. the stream is received incomplete by a part of the recipients.
In [6], the authors of the present paper demonstrate that TA are well suited
to model secure multicast/broadcast communication with possible packet loss
since they use TA to model an instance of the Eﬃcient Multi-chained Stream
Signature (EMSS) multicast protocol family [46]. The usefulness of TA in this
context is a consequence of the natural way in which one-to-many (one-to-all)
communications typical of multicast (broadcast) sessions can be modelled as
synchronizations between the CA constituting a TA. In particular, a multicast
composition operator ‖J is deﬁned, which enables the modelling of a multicast
protocol involving one sender and n receivers as one-to-J synchronizations
between the components of a TA. Recall that such an operator cannot be
deﬁned in IOA.
As a ﬁnal consideration we observe that the basic communication mecha-
nism in most CCS-like process algebras, on the other hand, is pairwise syn-
chronization (in the form of an input/output handshake) between just two
processes. This shows why in [41], where a CCS-like process algebra is used
in order to exploit a well-established analysis framework, replication of pair-
wise synchronizations is used to simulate multicast/broadcast communication.
Moreover, packet loss is modelled by considering a receiver process that non-
deterministically chooses whether to receive a packet. In the TA framework,
also packet loss can be modelled in a natural way by varying the one-to-many
type of synchronization per action.
5 Towards a TA Framework for the Analysis of Security
Properties
In [7], the authors of the present paper deﬁne an insecure communication
scenario for TA. Their scenario can be used to analyze security properties of
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cryptographic communication protocols involving two roles, viz. an initiator
TA TS and a responder TA TR. Rather than a direct communication between
TS and TR, all communication is assumed to ﬂow through an insecure channel
TA TIC . This insecure channel may release some messages to an intruder TA
TX , which in its turn can either listen to or modify (fake) the messages pass-
ing through this channel. When verifying security properties for cryptographic
communication protocols, it is indeed quite common to include an additional
intruder (a` la Dolev-Yao [15]) component that is supposed to be malicious and
whose aim is to subvert the protocol’s correct behaviour. A protocol speciﬁ-
cation is consequently considered secure with respect to a security property
if it satisﬁes this property despite the presence of the intruder. Abstracting
from the cryptographic details concerning the operations according to which
messages can be encrypted, decrypted, etc., the insecure scenario is informally
described by the TA interactions sketched in Fig. 1.
TI
TP
injecteavesdrop
assertions assertionssend/receivesend/receive ICTTS TR
TX
publicpublic
Fig. 1. An insecure communication scenario for TA.
TP denotes the TA representing the protocol speciﬁcation in the absence of
the intruder. It is thus deﬁned by hiding all public send/receive actions that
pass through the insecure channel and then enforcing max-ai synchroniza-
tion between {TS, TR, TIC}. TP is called the max-ai TA over {TS, TR, TIC}
that is obtained after hiding all public send/receive actions. TP thus appears
as a black box, possibly with some output actions (assertion) signalling the
successful reception of messages. Usually such signals are used only for veriﬁ-
cation purposes. TI denotes the TA representing the protocol speciﬁcation in
the presence of the intruder. So-called eavesdrop and inject actions serve as
the backdoor for intrusion. This is exactly what is needed to guarantee that
the intruder may communicate with TP only through the insecure channel. TI
is thus deﬁned to be the max-ai TA over {TP , TX} that is obtained after hiding
all actions the intruder can eavesdrop from and inject back into the insecure
channel. In this way, maximal synchronization is enforced also between the
intruder and the protocol. This deﬁnes an insecure communication scenario
for TA by composing a secure communication scenario with an intruder.
In the literature, several eﬀorts have been made to prevent the unautho-
rized information ﬂow in multilevel computer systems [8], i.e. systems where
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processes and objects are bound to a speciﬁc security level. An example from
military jargon is the fact that documents are generally hierarchized from un-
classiﬁed to top secret. The seminal idea of non interference proposed in [28]
aims at assuring that information can only ﬂow from low levels to higher
ones and not vice versa. This notion has been compactly modelled in [43]
in terms of automata whose sets of (input) actions are split into low and
high classes. This formalization moreover satisﬁes the condition of Bell and
La Padula [8], which forbids the so-called ‘read-up’ and ‘write-down’. In the
context of a CCS-like process algebra, on the other hand, the ﬁrst taxonomy
of non-interference-like properties has been uniformly deﬁned in [20,21,22]. In
particular, processes in the algebra were divided into high and low processes,
according to the level of actions that they can perform. To detect whether an
incorrect information ﬂow (i.e. from high to low) has occurred, a particular
non-interference-like property has been deﬁned, the so-called Non Deducibility
on Compositions (NDC). NDC essentially says that a process is secure with
respect to wrong information ﬂows if its low behaviour in isolation appears to
be the same as its low behaviour when interacting with any high-level process.
NDC can be reformulated from the world of multilevel systems to the one of
network security. See also [24,26], where the low-level process becomes a spec-
iﬁcation of a cryptographic communication protocol, and the behaviour of the
protocol running in isolation is compared with that of the protocol running in
parallel with any possible adversary.
As a further step, a Generalized NDC (GNDC) has been formulated in [26],
in order to encompass in a uniform way many security properties. Informally,
a speciﬁcation P satisﬁes GNDC α(P ) if and only if P , despite the fact that
it is running in a hostile environment, appears indistinguishable from α(P )
(with respect to a notion  of external observation). This α(P ) represents the
correct behaviour of P . By varying α(P ), several security properties can be
deﬁned and analyzed within this generalized schema. 2 In order to embed TA
in the well-established analysis framework just described, the authors of the
present paper formulated the GNDC schema in terms of TA in [7].
Based on the GNDC schema in terms of TA, a compositional analysis
strategy for the above insecure scenario is described. This strategy can be
used to verify security properties in the communication protocol modelled by
the scenario. In fact, in [7] the GNDC schema in terms of TA, together with
the insecure communication scenario for TA, is used to show that integrity is
guaranteed in the deterministic (1,2) schema of the EMSS protocol. While
this has already been validated in [41], where a CCS-like process algebra was
2 Recently a slightly extended GNDC schema was deﬁned [25], incorporating the fact that
the set of bad behaviours of P may depend on P itself and on the property under scrutiny.
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used instead, this particular case study does show the eﬀectiveness of TA for
the analysis of security properties. Note that this case study moreover shows
that the approaches described in Sections 4 and 5 can be combined in order to
provide a compositional analysis strategy for verifying security properties in
cryptographic protocols with multicast/broadcast communication. One may
comment that [7] tests a theoretical approach over a protocol for which the se-
curity property to be veriﬁed is already known to be guaranteed. Nevertheless,
this case study has been investigated for testing the approach. However, the
use of TA is not limited to proving integrity, but also other security properties
like secrecy and entity authentication can be veriﬁed.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented a survey of the use of TA for the speciﬁcation
and analysis of some issues from the ﬁeld of security. More precisely, we have
showed how TA can adequately be used to model and verify access control
policies, multicast/broadcast communication protocols, and (cryptographic)
communication protocols. In many ways, this paper accompanies [33], where
a survey of the use of TA for CSCW was presented. An increasing number
of papers bears witness to the usefulness of TA in the early design phase of
distributed and reactive systems. These examples are not limited to ﬁelds like
CSCW [5,17,18,36] and security [3,4,6,7,16], but extend to areas like software
engineering [19,30,31]. In fact, a spectrum from hardware components to
protocols for interacting groups of people has by now been modelled by TA.
The TA framework supports the design of reactive and distributed sys-
tems and protocols by making explicit the role of actions and the choice of
transitions governing the communication, coordination, cooperation, and col-
laboration. Moreover, the formal setup and the possibility of a modular design
provide analytic tools for the veriﬁcation of desired properties of complex com-
puter systems. Model-checking techniques, such as those employed in [3], can
consequently be used to validate the resulting systems. A goal for the future
is to try to automate the currently manual speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of
properties in the TA framework. Since TA form an extension of IOA, the IOA
Language and Toolset [27] may be of help when trying to achieve this goal.
This framework provides tool support for deﬁning IOA as well as validating
their properties (through theorem proving, model checking, and simulation).
Another goal for the future is to extend the TA framework with time,
probability, or both. Such extensions of automata-based formalisms have been
well studied in the literature, e.g. for IOA [39,48]. In this respect, also the well-
developed theory of timed automata needs to be mentioned [1,35]. Like their
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IOA counterparts, timed TA could consider the elapsing of time in the systems
they model, whereas probabilistic TA could allow a probabilistic choice of the
next state. Both have been extensively used to describe a variety of timing-
based algorithms and probabilistic cryptographic protocols, and to prove their
properties. Given these existing automata-theoretic results, the extension of
TA with time and probability is expected to be a feasible one.
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